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Abstract
The coordination of multiple autonomous vehicles into convoys or platoons is
expected on our highways in the near future. However, before such platoons can be
deployed, the new autonomous behaviours of the vehicles in these platoons must
be certified. An appropriate representation for vehicle platooning is as a multi-
agent system in which each agent captures the “autonomous decisions” carried out
by each vehicle. In order to ensure that these autonomous decision-making agents
in vehicle platoons never violate safety requirements, we use formal verification.
However, as the formal verification technique used to verify the agent code does
not scale to the full system and as the global verification technique does not capture
the essential verification of autonomous behaviour, we use a combination of the
two approaches. This mixed strategy allows us to verify safety requirements not
only of a model of the system, but of the actual agent code used to program the
autonomous vehicles.
1 Introduction
While “driverless cars” regularly appear in the media, they are neither “driverless” nor
fully autonomous. Legal constraints ensure that there must always be a responsible
human in the vehicle. However, although fully autonomous road vehicles remain fu-
turistic, the automotive industry is working on what are variously called “road trains”,
“car convoys” or “vehicle platoons”. Here, each vehicle autonomously follows the one
in front of it on the road, with the front vehicle in the platoon/convoy/train being driven
manually. This technology is being introduced by the automotive industry in order
to improve both the safety and efficiency of vehicles on very congested roads [18].
It is especially useful if the vehicles are trucks/lorries and if the road is a multi-lane
highway.
In these platoons, each vehicle clearly needs to communicate with others, at least
with the one immediately in front and the one immediately behind. Vehicle-to-vehicle
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(V2V) communication is used at a lower (continuous control system) level to adjust
each vehicle’s position in the lanes and the spacing between the vehicles. V2V is also
used at higher levels, for example to communicate joining requests, leaving requests,
or commands dissolving the platoon. So a traditional approach is to implement the
software for each vehicle in terms of hybrid (and hierarchical) control systems and to
analyse this using hybrid systems techniques.
However, as the behaviours and requirements of these automotive platoons become
more complex there is a move towards much greater autonomy within each vehicle.
Although the human in the vehicle is still responsible, the autonomous control deals
with much of the complex negotiation to allow other vehicles to leave and join, etc.
Traditional approaches involve hybrid automata [12] in which the continuous aspects
are encapsulated within discrete states, while discrete behaviours are expressed as tran-
sitions between these states. A drawback of combining discrete decision-making and
continuous control within a hybrid automaton is that it is difficult to separate the two
(high-level decision-making and continuous control) concerns. In addition, the repre-
sentation of the high-level decision-making can become unnecessarily complex.
As is increasingly common within autonomous systems, we use a hybrid autonomous
systems architecture where not only is the discrete decision-making component sepa-
rated from the continuous control system, but the behaviour of the discrete part is de-
scribed in much more detail. In particular, the agent paradigm is used [26]. This style
of architecture, using the agent paradigm, not only improves the system design from
an engineering perspective but also facilitates the system analysis and verification. In-
deed, we use this architecture for actually implementing automotive platoons, and we
here aim to analyse the system by verification.
Safety certification is an inevitable concern in the development of more autonomous
road vehicles, and verifying the safety and reliability of automotive platooning is cur-
rently one of the main challenges faced by the automotive industry. The verification
of such systems is challenging due to their complex and hybrid nature. Separating
discrete and continuous concerns, as above, potentially allows us to reason about the
decision-making components in isolation and ensure that no decision-making compo-
nent ever deliberately chooses an unsafe state. However, the use of the ‘agent’ concept
alone is not enough for our purposes, since this can still make its autonomous deci-
sions in an ‘opaque’ way. In order to be able to reason about, and formally verify,
the choices the system makes, we need a rational agent [27]. This not only makes
decisions, but has explicit representations of the reasons for making them, allowing
us to describe not only what the autonomous system chooses to do, but why it makes
particular choices [10].
The Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) model is one of the most widely used conceptual
models not only for describing rational agents but for actually implementing them [20].
A BDI-style agent is characterised by its beliefs, desires and intentions: beliefs rep-
resent the agent’s views about the world; desires represent the objectives to be ac-
complished; while intentions are the set of tasks currently undertaken by the agent to
achieve its desires. A BDI-style agent has a set of plans, determining how an agent
acts based on its beliefs and goals, and an event queue where events (perceptions from
the environment and internal subgoals) are stored. In this paper, we use the GWEN-
DOLEN programming language [4], developed for verifiable BDI-style programming,
2
to implement agent-based decision-making for an automotive platoon. This captures
the high-level, autonomous decision-making within each vehicle.
As part of safety certification, we need to verify the agent decisions, especially in
combination with the other vehicles. An autonomous rational agent makes decisions
about what actions to perform, etc, based on the beliefs, goals and intentions that the
agent holds at that time. We use a model-checking approach to demonstrate that the
rational agent always behaves in line with the platoon requirements and never deliber-
ately chooses options that end up in unsafe states. We verify properties of the rational
agent code using the AJPF model-checker [7], one of the very few model-checkers able
to cope with complex properties of BDI agents. Unfortunately, there are two drawbacks
to using AJPF: currently, AJPF does not support verification of timed behaviours; and
AJPF is resource heavy and cannot be used to verify the whole system. Consequently,
in this paper, we use a combined methodology for the verification of automotive pla-
tooning. To evaluate timing behaviour, we use a timed-automata abstraction and verify
the system using the Uppaal model-checker; to evaluate autonomous decisions, we
apply AJPF to the individual agents together with an abstraction of the other vehi-
cles/agents. Furthermore, we describe how these two approaches to modeling, i.e. BDI
models and timed-automata, can be combined to provide an appropriate basis for veri-
fying the behaviour of both individual agents and the whole system.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 the automotive
platoon and platoon requirements are presented. In Section 3 the hybrid agent archi-
tecture and the agent-based decision-making for automotive platoon are described. In
Section 4 the analysis and verification of an automotive platoon is considered. Finally,
in Section 5, concluding remarks are provided and future work is discussed.
2 Automotive Platoons
An automotive platoon, enabling road vehicles to travel as a group, is led by a vehi-
cle which is driven by a professional driver [21, 22, 25]. The following vehicles, i.e,
members of the platoon, are controlled autonomously. These vehicles, equipped with
low-level longitudinal (controlling speed) and lateral (controlling steering) control sys-
tems, travel in a platoon with pre-defined gaps between them. In addition, V2V com-
munication also connects the vehicles at an agent level. The lead vehicle, via its agent,
effectively carries out coordination over the platoon: setting parameters, creating cer-
tificates of joining and leaving, etc. Each individual vehicle observes its environment
and follows incoming commands from the lead agent. In what follows, we outline the
set of high-level automotive platoon concepts and procedures including how to join
and leave a platoon [2]. In addition, the initial requirements on these procedures for
the development of safe and reliable platooning are explained. From these we derive
the formal properties to be verified.
2.1 Joining the Platoon
A vehicle can join a platoon either at the end or in the middle with different control
strategies being used. The joining procedure is as follows:
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• a non-member vehicle sends a joining request to the platoon leader, expressing
the intended position in the platoon;
• if the vehicle has requested to join from the rear, the leader sends back an agree-
ment provided the maximum platoon length has not been reached and the platoon
is currently in normal operation;
• if the vehicle requests to join in front of (for example) vehicle X and the maxi-
mum platoon length has not been reached, the leader sends an “increase space”
command to vehicle X, and when the leader is informed that enough spacing
has been created (approx. 17 metres), it sends back an agreement to the joining
vehicle;
• upon receipt of an agreement, the joining vehicle changes its lane (changing lane
is a manual procedure which is performed by a driver);
• once the vehicle is in the correct lane, its automatic speed controller is enabled
and it approaches the preceding vehicle;
• when the vehicle is close enough to the preceding vehicle (less than 20 metres),
its automatic steering controller is enabled and it sends an acknowledgement to
the leader; and, finally
• the leader sends a “decrease space” command to vehicle X, and when the leader
is informed that spacing has been back to normal (approximately 5 metres), it
replies to the acknowledgement.
In order to ensure a safe joining operation, the following requirements should be pre-
served within the agent-based decision-making components of automotive platoon.
1. A vehicle must only initiate joining a platoon, i.e., changing lane, once it has
received confirmation from the leader.
2. Before autonomous control is enabled, a joining vehicle must approach the pre-
ceding vehicle, in the correct lane.
3. Automatic steering controller must only be enabled once the joining vehicle is
sufficiently close to the preceding vehicle.
2.2 Leaving the Platoon
A vehicle can request to leave platoon at any time. The leaving procedure is:
• a platoon member sends a leaving request to the leader and waits for authorisa-
tion;
• upon receipt of ‘leave’ authorisation, the vehicle increases its space from the
preceding vehicle;
• when maximum spacing has been achieved, the vehicle switches both its speed
and steering controller to ‘manual’ and changes its lane; and, finally
• the vehicle sends an acknowledgement to the leader.
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The two following requirements are necessary in order to meet with the agent-based
decision-making components of automotive platoon.
1. Except in emergency cases, a vehicle must not leave the platoon without autho-
risation from the leader.
2. When authorised to leave, autonomous control should not be disabled until the
maximum allowable platoon spacing has been achieved.
3 Agent-based Development of Automotive Platoon
We employ a hybrid agent architecture based on [5] for each vehicle:
Automotive 
Simulation 
Environment
Physical 
Engine
[ MATLAB/
Simulink ]
Abstraction
Agent
Decision
Making
Agent
[ TORCS ] [ MATLAB/Simulink ] [ Gwendolen ] [ Gwendolen ]
Real-time continuous control of the vehicle is managed by feedback controllers, imple-
mented in MATLAB, and observing the environment through its sensory input. This
is called the Physical Engine. The Physical Engine, in turn, communicates with an
Abstraction Agent that extracts discrete information from streams of continuous data
and passes this on a Decision-Making Agent. The Decision-Making Agent is a rational
agent which directs the Physical Engine by passing it instructions through the Abstrac-
tion Agent. Instructions from the Decision-Making Agent to the Abstraction Agent are
interpreted into meaningful instructions for Physical Engine.
To provide the complex environment necessary for effective simulation and testing,
we use an automotive simulator, TORCS [23], to implement the environment compo-
nent of the architecture. The Physical Engine is implemented in MATLAB, while both
Abstraction and Decision-Making Agents are programmed in the GWENDOLEN pro-
gramming language. An interface between TORCS and MATLAB/Simulink has been
developed that provides a means to control vehicles from MATLAB and Simulink.
Listing 1 shows some of the GWENDOLEN code from the Decision-Making
Agent for the joining procedure for follower vehicle. The GWENDOLEN syntax that
is needed for this example is summarised in Fig. 1. Essentially, GWENDOLEN is an
extension of Prolog-style declarative programming, incorporating explicit representa-
tions of goals, beliefs, and plans. For example, the first plan in Listing 1 (Line 7-12)
denotes that once the follower agent sets a goal to join the platoon, it sends a request to
the leader and waits for an agreement belief to become true. The changing lane plan in
Listing 1 (Line 14-19) can be executed if and only if the follower agent has the agree-
ment belief. In each iteration, the follower agent then selects plan based on its goals
and beliefs.
A GWENDOLEN agent can also perform deductive reasoning on its beliefs, ex-
pressed through its reasoning rules. In the ‘joining’ scenario, the follower agent de-
duces that its goal to join the platoon has been achieved if it believes all the prescribed
joining steps have been performed. This is represented by the platoon-ok belief.
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perform goal +!g [perform] adding a new goal to perform some actions
achievement +!g [achieve] adding a new goal and continuously attempting the
goal plans associated with the goal until the agent has
acquired the belief g
believe +b adding a new belief b
disbelieve -b removing a belief b
on-hold believe *b waiting for belief b to be true
plan trigger : guard← body trigger is the addition of a goal or a belief; guard gives
conditions under which the plan can be executed; body
is a stack of actions that should be performed
guard condition B x checking if belief x is perceivable
guard condition G x checking if goal x has been added
action perf(x) action x causing the execution of x
Figure 1: GWENDOLEN [4] Syntax
Essentially, the decision-making agent’s activity proceeds in sequence: the follower
has a goal to successfully join the platoon; it initiates changing lane, if it believes it has
received an agreement from the leader; and the follower achieves the joining goal if it
believes it is in right lane and the automatic speed and steering controller are enabled.
Changing lane is performed manually by a driver and as long as the speed and steering
controllers are not switched to automatic, driver needs to control speed and steering.
1
2Reason ing Rules
3j o i n i n g (X, Y):− name (X) , p l a t o o n−ok
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5P l a n s
6+! j o i n i n g (X, Y) [ a c h i e v e ] : {B name (X) , ~B j o i n _ a g r e e m e n t (X, Y) }
7<− +! s p e e d _ c o n t r ( 0 ) [ pe r fo rm ] , +! s t e e r i n g _ c o n t r ( 0 ) [ pe r fo rm ] ,
8. send ( l e a d e r , : t e l l , j o i n _ r e q (X, Y) ) , ∗ j o i n _ a g r e e m e n t (X, Y ) ;
9
10+! j o i n i n g (X, Y) [ a c h i e v e ] : {B name (X) , B j o i n _ a g r e e m e n t (X, Y) ,
11~B changed_ lane , ~G s e t _ s p a c i n g ( Z ) [ a c h i e v e ] }
12<− +! s p e e d _ c o n t r ( 0 ) [ pe r fo rm ] , +! s t e e r i n g _ c o n t r ( 0 ) [ pe r fo rm ] ,
13p e r f ( c h a n g i n g _ l a n e ( 1 ) ) , ∗ c h a n g e d _ l a n e ;
14
15+! j o i n i n g (X, Y) [ a c h i e v e ] : {B name (X) , B j o i n _ a g r e e m e n t (X, Y) ,
16B changed_ lane , ~B s p e e d _ c o n t r , ~ B s t e e r i n g _ c o n t r ,
17~B c l o s i n g _ e n o u g h , ~G s e t _ s p a c i n g ( Z ) [ a c h i e v e ] }
18<− +! s p e e d _ c o n t r ( 1 ) [ pe r fo rm ] , ∗ j o i n i n g _ d i s t a n c e ;
19
20+! j o i n i n g (X, Y) [ a c h i e v e ] : {B name (X) , B j o i n _ a g r e e m e n t (X, Y) ,
21B changed_ lane , B s p e e d _ c o n t r , ~B s t e e r i n g _ c o n t r ,
22B c l o s i n g _ e n o u g h , ~G s e t _ s p a c i n g ( Z ) [ a c h i e v e ] }
23<− +! s t e e r i n g _ c o n t r ( 1 ) [ pe r fo rm ] ;
24
25+! j o i n i n g (X, Y) [ a c h i e v e ] : {B name (X) , B j o i n _ a g r e e m e n t (X, Y) ,
26B changed_ lane , ~B speed_co n t , ~B s t e e r i n g _ c o n t r ,
27B c l o s i n g _ e n o u g h , ~G s e t _ s p a c i n g ( Z ) [ a c h i e v e ] }
28<− +! s p e e d _ c o n t r ( 1 ) [ pe r fo rm ] , +! s t e e r i n g _ c o n t r ( 1 ) [ pe r fo rm ] ;
29
30+! j o i n i n g (X, Y) [ a c h i e v e ] : {B name (X) , B j o i n _ a g r e e m e n t (X, Y) ,
31B changed_ lane , B s p e e d _ c o n t r , B s t e e r i n g _ c o n t r ,
32B c l o s i n g _ e n o u g h , ~B platoon_m , ~G s e t _ s p a c i n g ( Z ) [ a c h i e v e ] }
33<− . send ( l e a d e r , : t e l l , message (X, j o i n e d _ s u c c ) ,∗ platoon_m , p l a t o o n−ok ;
Listing 1: A Follower Vehicle’s code
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Joining the platoon is described in GWENDOLEN as an ‘achievement’ goal, mean-
ing that the agent continuously attempts the plans given in Listing 1 until it believes
that platoon-ok is true. This belief, platoon-ok, denotes that not only is the vehicle in
the right lane but that its automatic controllers are enabled. It also determines that the
leader has received an acknowledgement from the vehicle, confirming it has success-
fully joined the platoon. Subsequently, the agent deduces from its reasoning rule (Line
2) that the joining goal has indeed been achieved.
4 Verification
4.1 Verification Methodology
We can visualise the overall system as:
Comms AgentComms AgentComms Agent
The agent is a GWENDOLEN program, the Comms component is a simple transfer
protocol, and the vehicle represents the particular vehicular system that we interact
with. This is typically an automotive control system together with environmental inter-
actions, and we have validated this both in simulation (using the TORCS automotive
simulation) and in physical vehicles (using Jaguar outdoor rover vehicles).
Limits to Modelling/Verification. We are not going to formally verify the vehicular
control systems, and leave this to standard mathematical (usually analytic) techniques
from the Control Systems field. These control components, for example involving
following a prescribed path, avoiding local obstacles, keeping distance from object, etc,
are well-established and standard. Instead, we will verify the autonomous decisions the
vehicles make, captured within each vehicle’s ‘agent’ [10]. Each agent represents the
autonomous decision-maker within each vehicle and corresponds, in part, to the human
driver’s decisions. These decisions involve deciding where to go, when to turn, when
to stop, what to do in unexpected situations, etc. In the case of autonomous vehicle
convoys/platoons, the agent’s (and, hence, the vehicle’s) decisions concern when to
join the convoy, when to leave, what to do in an emergency, etc.
So, we begin by abstracting from all the vehicle control systems and environmental
interactions, representing these by one (potentially complex, depending on the vehi-
cle/environment interactions) automaton. We also use an automaton to describe the
simple transfer protocol that the vehicles use for their communication. In both these
cases we will use Timed Automata [1]. Simplified, our architecture is:
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Communications Agent
Program
Communications
Vehicle Control 
and Environment
Agent
Program
Communications
Vehicle Control 
and Environment
which, at least in principle, leads to an overarching formal model:
Timed 
Automaton AgentAutomaton
Timed
Automaton
Timed
Automaton
Agent
Automaton
Timed
Automaton
Timed
Automaton
In describing agent behaviour, the agent automaton comprises added (modal) dimen-
sions of (at least) belief and intention. Thus, the formal structures that allow us to fully
represent all the system above are quite complex, combining timed relations as well as
relations for each of the belief and intention dimensions [1, 19]. We will not describe
this formal model in detail but just note that it is a fusion [9, 11, 16] of timed and BDI
structures, 〈L,A,C, E , inv,RB , RI , l〉, where: L is a finite set of locations; A is a fi-
nite set of actions; C is a finite set of clocks; E ⊆ L × Ψ(C) × A × 2C × L is a set
of (timed) edges between locations; inv : L → Ψ(C) is a function associating each
location with some clock constraint in Ψ(C); RB : Ag → (L × L), where Ag is the
set of ‘agents’ and RB(a) provides the belief relation (corresponding to KD45 modal
logic) for agent a between locations; RI : Ag → (L × L), where RB(c) provides the
intention relation (KD) for agent c between locations; and l : L → 2AP is a labelling
function essentially capturing those propositions true at each location (AP is a set of
atomic propositions).
The logic then interpreted over such structures combines [11] the syntax of timed
temporal logic, for example♦≤5finish , and the syntax of modal logics of belief, desire
and intention, for example Bxstarted (i.e. “agent x believes that started is true”).
In principle, though very complex, we could provide all our convoy requirements in
such a logic, build structures of the above form for our convoy implementation, and
then develop a model-checking approach for this combination [15]. However, there are
several reasons we choose to abstract and separate the timed/agent strands, as follows.
• For certification it is important that we verify the actual agent program used
in each vehicle, not a derived model of this. Consequently, we utilise a pro-
gram model checking [24] approach to assess the correctness of each agent pro-
gram. For this formal verification of the agent’s autonomous decisions, we use
AJPF [7], an extension of the Java PathFinder (JPF) program model checker [14]
for GWENDOLEN that allows verification of belief/intention properties.
• We do not have the detailed implementations of all the communications proto-
col, the vehicular control, and environmental interaction, and so use an abstract,
formal model to describe these, rather than actual code.
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• JPF is an explicit-state program-checker and is relatively slow; AJPF builds a
BDI programming layer on top of JPF and is at least an order of magnitude
slower. Consequently, AJPF cannot realistically be used for verification of the
whole system. In addition, as AJPF does not yet have real-time capabilities, then
verifying timing aspects within AJPF is difficult.
While these appear problematic, there are several useful simplifications in our context:
• When verifying autonomous behaviour, the formal verification we carry out con-
cerns the interaction of beliefs, intentions, etc, within each agent. These do not
extend between agents and so, checking of beliefs, intentions, etc, can be lo-
calised within each agent.
• In the requirements to be checked, the timed and BDI formulae are quite sepa-
rate, i.e. ♦≤5finish ∧ Bxstarted but never ♦≤5Bxstarted or Bx♦≤5finish .
As the overall logic is a fusion, and since there are no explicit timing constraints
within an agent program (agents have fast internal computation), then this allows
us to deal with the dimensions separately.
So, given an overall system, S, over which we wish to check ϕ, then we reduce S |= ϕ
to two problems:
1. for each individual agent, Ai, within S, verify the agent properties from ϕ, i.e.
ϕa, on the agent within an untimed environment (an over-approximation); and
2. verify the timing properties from ϕ i.e. ϕt, on the whole system where the agent
program is replaced by an untimed automaton describing solely its input-output
behaviour (abstracting from internal BDI reasoning).
We explain both of these in more detail, before giving the relevant theorems.
Timed Automaton−→Untimed Automaton. This is achieved by the over-approximation
as above and then allows us to verify V ′i ‖Comms′‖Ai |= ϕa using AJPF:
Timed 
Automaton:
Comms
Agent
Program: Ai
Timed
Automaton:
Vi
Untimed 
Automaton:
Comms’
Agent
Program: Ai
Untimed
Automaton:
Vi’
ABSTRACT
Note that going from a timed automaton to an untimed one, for example replacing be-
haviours such as ♦≤3receive by ♦receive provides this over-approximation. Hence,
for example, Comms′ |= ϕ implies Comms |= ϕ, but not necessarily the converse.
Agent Model −→ Untimed Automaton. This is achieved by extracting a model of
the agent program’s behaviour, then removing belief/intention aspects from this:
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Timed 
Automaton:
Comms
Agent
Program: Ai
Timed
Automaton:
Vi
Timed 
Automaton:
Comms
Untimed
Automaton: Ai’
Timed
Automaton:
Vi
ABSTRACT
Formal verification using Uppaal is then carried out on the whole system with all agents
abstracted in this way.
We now prove important properties of these abstractions. For simplicity, we assume
that S consists of just two agents/vehicles; this result can then easily be generalised to
greater numbers of agents/vehicles.
Theorem 1. Let S == V1 ‖ A1 ‖ Comms12 ‖ A2 ‖ V2. If
a) V ′1 ‖ A1 ‖ Comms12′ |= ϕa and
b) V ′2 ‖ A2 ‖ Comms12′ |= ϕa and
c) V1 ‖ A′1 ‖ Comms12 ‖ A′2 ‖ V2 |= ϕt.
then S |= ϕa ∧ ϕt.
Proof. Since V ′1 and Comms12
′ are over-approximations, then
V ′1‖A1‖Comms12′ |= ϕa implies V1‖A1‖Comms12 |= ϕa.
Similarly, (b) gives us V2‖A2‖Comms12 |= ϕa. As the agent properties in ϕa are
local, we can compose these to give V1‖A1‖Comms12‖A2‖V2 |= ϕa and so S |= ϕa.
By (c) we know that V1‖A′1‖Comms12‖A′2‖V2 |= ϕt yet, as A1 and A2 have no
timed behaviour to begin with, we know thatA′1 andA
′
2 give us exactly the same timed
behaviours. Consequently, V1‖A1‖Comms12‖A2‖V2 |= ϕt and so S |= ϕt.
These two together give us S |= ϕa ∧ ϕt.
Theorem 2. If V1‖A1‖Comms12‖A2‖V2 |= ϕt then V1‖A′1‖Comms12‖A′2‖V2 |=
ϕt.
Proof. Since the timing behaviour of eachAi is identical to eachA′i then V1‖A′1‖Comms12‖A′2‖V2
and V1‖A1‖Comms12‖A2‖V2 are equivalent.
4.2 Individual Agent Verification using AJPF
To verify agent properties, we use the AJPF model checker on our agent, written in the
GWENDOLEN language, as above. For instance, we verify that:
If a vehicle never believes it has received confirmation from the leader,
then it never initiates joining to the platoon.
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This safety property corresponds to the first requirement of joining a platoon, as
given in Section 2, and can be defined as:
2 (G f3 platoon_m (f3, f1)
→¬Df3 perf(changing_lane(1))W Bf3 join_agr (f3, f1))
(1)
Here Gx y stands for a goal y that agent x tries to achieve, Bx z stands for a belief z
of agent x, and Dx k stands for an action k that agent x performs/does. The standard
LTL operators, such as 2 meaning “always in the future” and W meaning “unless”,
are used. An instance of the above , where the agent never receives a join agreement,
is:
2 (G f3 platoon_m (f3, f1) &¬B f3 join_agr (f3, f1))
→ 2¬D f3 perf(changing_lane(1))
(2)
To be able to check such a property, incoming perceptions/communications should be
provided. We supply two automata: Comm′, representing communication to/from
the other agents; and V ′i , representing vehicle responses to agent actions. Under this
configuration, we were able to carry out the agent verification in around 12 hours.
We have verified a range of safety and liveness properties and we provide some
joining/leaving examples below. Note that the following properties can also be simi-
larly expressed in terms of the weak until operator, W ; however, we denote a particular
instance of these properties for the sake of brevity.
If a vehicle ever sends a ‘join’ request to the leader and eventually receives
the join agreement and it is not already in the correct lane, it initiates
‘joining’ the platoon by performing “changing lane”.
( G f3 platoon_m (f3, f1) & ¬B f3 changed_lane &
2 ItD f3send(leader, tell, message(f3, 1, f1))→ ♦ B f3 join_agr (f3, f1))
→ ♦ D f3 perf(changing_lane(1))
(3)
Property 3 is a liveness property ensuring that eventually (using the LTL ♦ operator)
the joining procedure initiates the changing lane control system once its condition is
fulfilled. Similarly, we can verify other properties to show progress such as eventually
the speed and steering controllers are switched to automatic if pre-conditions hold.
Other verified properties ensuring safe operation of the platoon are as follows.
If a vehicle never believes it has changed its lane, then it never switches to
the automatic speed controller.
2 ( G f3 platoon_m (f3, f1) & ¬B f3 changed_lane )
→ 2 ¬D f3 perf(speed_controller(1))
(4)
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If a vehicle never believes it has received a confirmation from the leader,
then it never switches to the automatic speed controller.
2 ( G f3 platoon_m (f3, f1) & ¬B f3 join_agr (f3, f1) )
→ 2 ¬D f3 perf(speed_controller(1))
(5)
If a vehicle never believes it is sufficiently close to the preceding vehicle,
it never switches to the automatic steering controller.
2 ( G f3 platoon_m (f3, f1) & ¬B f3 joining_distance )
→ 2 ¬D f3 perf(steering_controller(1))
(6)
If a vehicle never believes it has received a confirmation from the leader to
leave the platoon, i.e., increasing spacing has been achieved, then it never
disables its autonomous control.
Note that the leader sends back the ‘leave’ agreement to follower3 if, and only if, it
received an acknowledgement from follower3 showing that spacing has been increased.
2 (G f3 leave_platoon & ¬B f3 leave_agr (f3))
→ 2 ¬D f3 perf(speed_controller(0))
(7)
It is important to recall that perceptions and communications coming in to the agent are
represented as internal beliefs. Hence the proliferation of belief operators. The AJPF
program model checker explores all possible combinations of shared beliefs and mes-
sages and so, even with the relatively low number of perceptions above, the combinato-
rial explosion associated with exploring all possibilities is very significant. Therefore,
verifying the whole multi-agent platooning system using AJPF is infeasible.
To verify the global properties of multi-agent platooning, we use a complementary
approach. We manually generate a model of the whole system as timed-automata and
use the Uppaal model checker to establish the (timed) correctness of multi-agent pla-
tooning. In the following, we review the relevant timed-automata and highlight some of
the global safety properties of vehicle platooning that have been verified using Uppaal.
4.3 Timed Automata Model of Automotive Platoons
We model vehicle platooning in Uppaal as a parallel composition of identical processes
describing the behaviour of each individual vehicle in the platoon along with an extra
process describing the behaviour of the platoon leader (the leader automaton). Each
of these vehicle processes is a parallel composition of two timed automata, vehicle and
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agent. The agent automaton, in turn, comprises both Comms and A′i components, as
given in Section 4.1 .
The vehicle automaton supplies incoming perceptions for the agent automaton. It
describes the sensor models and action execution. The vehicle automaton receives,
and responds to, the action commands of the corresponding agent through three pairs
of binary channels modelling change-lane, set-space and join-distance commands and
responses. To model timing behaviour, we define a clock for the vehicle automaton
which models the time assessments for “changing lane”, “setting space” and “joining
distance” actions. Based on engineers’ study, actions change-lane, set-space and join-
distance take 20± 5, 10± 5 and 10± 5 seconds, respectively.
The agent automaton models an abstracted version of the GWENDOLEN agent by
excluding all internal computations of the agent. The overall structure of an agent con-
sists of 5 regions, shown in Fig. 2. If the automaton is in the IDLE region, which con-
sists of only one location, then the agent does not perform any action at that moment.
The regions JOIN, LEAVE, SET-SPACE and SW-STEERING represent the sequence of
necessary communications with other agents (and the vehicle) in order to achieve the
agent’s goals. If a vehicle is part of the platoon it can leave the platoon or receive
messages from the leader to set spacing or switch steering controller. If a vehicle is not
part of the platoon, it can only join the platoon. Each agent automaton contains two
binary channels join-r[i][0] and leave-r[i][0] to model the unicast sending of ‘join’
and ‘leave’ requests to the leader and two binary channels joined-suc[i][0] and left-
suc[i][0] to model the unicast sending of ‘join’ and ‘leave’ acknowledgements to the
leader. These channels are used to model the message passing between the following
agents and the leader, modelled in decision-making agent (Section. 3). Furthermore,
each agent automaton also contains channels to send commands to its vehicle and re-
ceive acknowledgements from its vehicle. The agent automaton has a clock process-
time that is used to model the time consumption for achieving goals.
Next, we define a leader automaton to model the external behaviour of the leader
agent (Fig. 3), where the coordination between agents is handled through unicast syn-
chronisation channels. Upon receipt of a joining request, i.e., join-r[i][0]!, it sends a
“set spacing” command to the preceding agent where the requested agent wants to be
placed. The leader sends a joining agreement, i.e., join-agr-c[0][i]?, to the requested
agent, if it has successfully set spacing between the two vehicles where the requested
vehicle will be placed. Follower i synchronises with the leader via join-agr-c channel.
Then the leader waits for an acknowledgement from the requested agent. It waits for at
most the upper bound time for setting space, changing lane and getting close enough
to the front vehicle. Upon receipt of the acknowledgement, the leader sends a confir-
mation to the agent and a “set spacing” command to the preceding agent to decrease its
space with the front vehicle to complete the joining procedure. If it does not receive the
acknowledgement in time, it sends a “set spacing” command to the preceding agent to
decrease its space and waits for a spacing acknowledgement then goes back to the idle
location, ready for the next request. The leader communicates with the agents through
synchronisation channels. It passes messages to the follower through channels dedi-
cated to the agreements, setting space and switching steering controller. For simplicity,
we assume the leader handles only one request at any time.
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Fig. 2: The Uppaal Agent Automaton
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Fig. 3: The leader Automaton
4.4 Multi-agent Platooning Verification using Uppaal
Now we have timed automata representations of the platoon, we can carry out veri-
fication of their properties using Uppaal. For simplicity, we analyse the global and
timing properties of a multi-agent platoon composed simply of a leader and three ve-
hicles (with three corresponding) agents. We assume vehicles can always set spacing
and joining distance in time, i.e., 10 ± 5, but can fail to change lane in time, i.e., less
than 20 + 5. In the following, we first give examples of global properties involving
the coordination between the leader and the followers. Second, we evaluate timing
requirements: the safe lower and upper bounds for joining and leaving activities. We
observed that the verification of these properties took less than 3 seconds using Uppaal.
If an agent ever receives a joining agreement from the leader, then the preceding
agent has increased its space to its front agent. This property is formulated for agent
a3 as follows (A represents “on all paths”):
A2 ((a3.rdy_ch_lane && l.joining_vehicle.front == 2)
imply ( a2.incr_spacing && a2.spacing_done))
(8)
where a3 is the agent which is in the rdy_ch_lane location, i.e, the agent has received a
joining agreement, variable joining_vehicle.front indicates the identification of the
preceding agent, flag a2.incr_spacing models that the preceding agent has received an
“increase space” command from the leader and, finally, flag a2.spacing_done models
whether agent a2 has successfully increased its space. We can also verify this property
for agents a2 and a4. Property 8 is a safety requirement ensuring that a vehicle initiates
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“changing lane” only if sufficient spacing is provided.
The next property of interest is whether a joining request always ends up increasing
space of the preceding vehicle. To express this property, we use the leads to property
form, written ϕ  ψ. It states that whenever ϕ is satisfied, then eventually ψ will be
satisfied. Such properties are written as ϕ 99K ψ in Uppaal. We verify the property (9)
to show that whenever agent a3 is in the wait_ j_ agr location, i.e., has sent a joining
request, and agent a2 is the preceding vehicle in the platoon, then eventually a3 will
receive an increasing space command and will perform the action.
(a3.wait_j_agr && l.joining_vehicle.front == 2)
99K ( a2.incr_spacing && a2.spacing_done)
(9)
To ensure that the spacing always decreases after a joining procedure, i.e., platoon
returns back to a normal state, we verify that if ever the leader receives a joining re-
quest, it eventually sends a decreasing space command to the preceding agent unless
the joined agent is the final one in the platoon.
A2 ((a3.join_completed && l.joining_vehicle.front == 2)
imply ( !a2.incr_spacing && a2.spacing_done))
(10)
Given the required time for a vehicle to carry out “set spacing”, “joining distance” and
“changing lane” tasks, we are interested in verifying if an agent accomplishes joining
the platoon within an expected interval: waiting time for agreement + changing lane +
joining distance + waiting time for leader confirmation, represented in Property 11.
A2 (a2.join_completed imply
(a2.process_time ≥ 50 && a2.process_time ≤ 90)) (11)
Similarly, we check if an agent leaves a platoon within an expected interval: waiting
time for agreement + changing lane + waiting time for leader confirmation. Waiting
time for agreement is equal to the time needed to set space and waiting time for leader
confirmation is zero because we assume switching steering controllers is immediate.
A2 (a2.leave_completed imply
(a2.process_time ≥ 30 && a2.process_time ≤ 50)) (12)
5 Concluding Remarks
The verification of safety considerations for automotive platooning is quite complex
and difficult. There are several reasons for this.
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• These are non-trivial hybrid autonomous systems, with each vehicle mixing
feedback controllers and agent decision-making.
• There is a strong requirement to verify the actual code used in the implemen-
tation, rather than extracting a formal model of the program’s behaviour — this
leads on to program model-checking, which is resource intensive.
• There are no other practical systems able to model check temporal and modal
properties of complex BDI agents — thus we are led to AJPF.
• AJPF is very resource intensive (as we have seen, 12 hours for some agent prop-
erties) and cannot be practically used to verify whole system properties of auto-
motive platooning.
• Especially when interacting with real vehicles we need to verify timed properties.
Thus it is perhaps not surprising that such formal verification has never been reported
before. Safety verification of platooning in the contorl level was investigated exten-
sively [13, 17]. A combined verification approach for vehicle platooning is proposed
in [3] where the system behaviour is specified in CSP and B formal methods. A compo-
sitional verification approach for vehicle platooning is introduced in [8] where feedback
controllers and agent decision-making are mixed.
In order to address all of the above concerns, we have adopted a twin strategy. We
use AJPF to verify individual agent properties, given realistic abstractions of environ-
mental interactions. We then abstract from the BDI code and produce an abstract agent
automaton suitable for use in Uppaal verification. This then allows us to formally verify
platoon requirements and safety considerations, a sample of which we have included.
It must be emphasised that the agent code that we verify is actually the code that
controls the vehicle both in the TORCS simulation and in the real vehicle that we are
developing. Thus, as long as the environmental abstractions are correct, we can be sure
of the decisions made by the agent.
Future Work. There is clearly much future work to tackle. An obvious one is to
continue efforts to improve the efficiency of AJPF.
Maintaining a safe platoon in case of recoverable latency and dissolving a platoon
in the case of unrecoverable latency are two procedures that are not implemented in our
verified agent code due to a shortcoming of AJPF. Adding these two procedures to the
agent grows the system space to the extent that AJPF fails to verify any property. Thus,
we are investigating an agent abstraction at the level of goals, beliefs and intentions in
order to use AJPF for verification of more complex agents.
Since we are concerned with certification of automotive platooning in practice,
we are aiming to extract a more comprehensive list of formal properties from official
platoon requirement documents. Related to this, we are also in the process of porting
the agent architecture on to a real vehicle and so testing the platooning algorithms in
physical, as well as just simulation, contexts.
Finally, an important aspect of our two pronged strategy is to link the models used
in Uppaal to the programs that AJPF uses. In this paper we generated the Uppaal
models by hand, extracted temporal formulae to capture their (non-timed) behaviour,
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and then verified these temporal formulae on the agent code. This at least shows that
the timed automata we built correspond to the agent code execution. We believe that all
of this can be automated. In particular, we plan to use the AJPF framework to explore
the agent code executions and so automatically build up the automaton that Uppaal can
use [6]. This would give a much stronger form of completeness and would improve
efficiency.
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